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Introduction
Within the past few years, the United States has seen the growth of
hydrofracking (“fracking”) technology, the exploration of shales, and the
development of unconventional resources,1 the combination of which has
resulted in an overabundance of natural gas.  Aside from having a large
domestic reserve of natural gas, the United States also has the transporta-
tion infrastructure to ensure the steady supply of natural gas.2  Further-
more, the United States continues to invest in technology to improve
fracking capabilities, which ensures the productivity and sustainability of
the current supply.  In fact, the supply of natural gas within the United
States appears to be rapidly increasing.3  Additionally, the United States
has both the capital and physical resources to export liquefied natural gas
(“LNG”).  Not only does it already have several LNG import facilities that
can be converted into export facilities, but it also has companies lined up
to receive applications to build these facilities.4  Quite simply, the United
States is ready to export LNG.  Going a step further, many countries
abroad need American LNG exports.5  Numerous Asian and European6
countries are seeing an increase in their needs for LNG imports.  Not only
are their energy needs increasing, but some of their traditional suppliers
are also decreasing their output.7  As a result, many are seeking out Ameri-
can LNG exporters to ensure future LNG supplies.8
The current regulatory framework for the international export of LNG
is governed by Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, which allows companies to
1. See CHARLES EBINGER ET AL., BROOKINGS ENERGY SECURITY INITIATIVE, LIQUID MAR-
KETS: ASSESSING THE CASE FOR U.S. EXPORTS OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS vi, 1 (2012).
2. See About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines –  Transporting Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ng
pipeline/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); but see EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 R
(stating that “[t]o maximize the economic potential of . . . U.S. shale gas . . . there will be
a requirement for significant expansion in the nation’s continental natural gas pipeline
network . . . .”).
3. See Abundant U.S. Natural Gas Supply Slakes Asian Demand, FORBES (Sept. 23,
2011, 6:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/09/23/abun-
dant-u-s-natural-gas-supply-slakes-asian-demand/.
4. Applications Received by DOE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the
Lower-48 States (as of Mar. 7, 2013), ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
2013/05/f0/summary_lng_applications.pdf [hereinafter Applications].
5. See MICHAEL LEVI, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A STRATEGY FOR U.S. NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS 18 (2012), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_
links/06_exports_levi.pdf.
6. See EBINGER, supra note 1, at 22, 25. R
7. See id. at 21– 22, 25; Qatar Plans to Build LNG Plants in the United States, EQUI-
TIES.COM, http://www.equities.com/news/headline-story?dt=2012-10-25&val=632892&
cat=energy (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
8. See EQUITIES.COM, supra note 7; Tepco Mulls Importing Up to 10 mil mt/year Lean R
LNG to Lower Costs, PLATTS (Nov. 7, 2012, 4:36 AM), http://www.platts.com/RSSFeed-
DetailedNews/RSSFeed/Natural Gas/7234305; Tony Daltorio, Why Japan’s Desperately
Seeking U.S. LNG, MONEY MORNING (Mar. 25, 2013), http://moneymorning.com/2013/
03/25/why-japans-desperately-seeking-u-s-lng/; A´ngel Gonza´lez & Ben Lefebrve, Qatar
Petroleum-Exxon Venture Requests Permit to Export U.S. Natural Gas, WSJ.com (Aug. 17,
2012, 7:23 PM), 1– 2, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044437510457
7595760678718068.html.
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export freely to only those countries with free trade agreements.9  How-
ever, companies are only allowed to export to countries that lack free trade
agreements if the Department of Energy (“DOE”) determines that it is in
the public interest.10  Because the current standards used to determine
whether such an export is in the “public interest” are somewhat ambigu-
ous,11 a more clear set of factors is needed.  However, rather than create a
new set of guidelines, the DOE should draw from the current domestic
regulatory framework for the transportation and sale of natural gas.
In this Note, I will first describe the process by which shale gas is
extracted and LNG is produced.  I will then discuss the advantages in geol-
ogy, technology, and infrastructure that the United States holds in uncon-
ventional resource production.  Next, I will discuss growing international
needs for United States LNG exports.  After addressing international
demand, I will then compare studies that point out the benefits and impli-
cations of LNG exports.  In particular, I will focus on the definitive study
conducted by the National Economic Research Associates (“NERA”) and its
conclusion that LNG exports will yield a net economic benefit for the
United States.12
Following the geopolitical discussion of LNG exports, I will then turn
to the regulatory and legal aspects of this fledgling industry, focusing spe-
cifically on Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act.  I will then discuss the Depart-
ment of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy’s (“DOE/FE”) refusal to grant
export permits to countries with which the United States does not have
free trade agreements.13  I will then analyze the DOE/FE’s Order 2961 and
Order 3282— permits that have been granted for LNG exports— and extract
the factors the DOE/FE finds relevant when determining whether or not a
permit is in the public interest.  Following this analysis, I will then provide
a brief overview of the history of the regulation of domestic natural gas
production, noting the mass deregulation that occurred alongside its
development.
Next, I will argue that we should build upon the existing foundation
when drafting a regulatory framework for LNG exports.  While the domes-
tic natural gas production system is largely unregulated, pipelines and local
distribution companies face heavy regulation.14  The LNG export regula-
tory system should incorporate as much deregulation as possible, main-
taining regulation in only the most important areas, specifically areas
9. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717b (West 2012).
10. Id.
11. See generally Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 2961 (May 20,
2011) [hereinafter DOE/FE Order 2961], available at http://www.fossil.energy.gov/pro-
grams/gasregulation/authorizations/Orders_Issued_2011/ord2961.pdf (providing the
DOE’s reasoning in reaching its decision).
12. W. DAVID MONTGOMERY ET AL., NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, MACROECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF LNG EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES (2012), available at http://www.fossil.
energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/nera_lng_report.pdf.
13. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 717b (West 2012).
14. See The Market Under Regulation, 1, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.
org/regulation/market.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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concerning monopolies and consumer protection, which have proved
important in the development of the industry’s regulation.  In particular, I
will argue that we should implement changes at both the structural and
substantive levels.
Regarding changes at the structural level, I will argue that the LNG
export regulatory system as it currently exists, through its failure to iden-
tify a clear set of rulemaking procedures or criteria to follow, is too intru-
sive, as the pipeline regulatory system has been superimposed on LNG
exports.  The nebulosity of the DOE/FE’s rulings is what makes the system
so invasive.  The standard for obtaining permits, as it exists, is entirely too
subjective, placing the entirety of the decision-making process in the hands
of the DOE/FE, rather than allowing decisions to be made based on an
objective set of standards or a list enunciating specific criteria companies
must meet to protect the public interest.  The lack of structural codification
proves disturbing, as it endows the DOE/FE with autocratic authority gov-
erning LNG export permits.  The DOE/FE should not be the sole arbiter of
determining what constitutes the public interest at its leisure and discre-
tion.  A more democratic process must be instituted.  Currently, the DOE/
FE has authorized permits exporting LNG to both FTA and non-FTA coun-
tries, as companies have been able to provide more convincing arguments/
statistical data to the DOE/FE.  However, outdoing one’s opponent should
not serve as the mechanism for the authorization of permits.  Instead, a
clear, ordered set of standards must exist for companies to meet in order to
protect domestic interests.  After companies meet this objective set of crite-
ria, once LNG exporters can meet certain floors guaranteeing that they will
meet domestic needs for a certain number of years, they should then be
allowed to operate within a structural framework devoid of any regulation
governing the location or quantity of their exports.
Finally, when considering what domestic floor is appropriate, I will
argue that three factors must be taken into account: (1) the prevention of
monopoly and abuse by producers; (2) the protection of consumers from
exploitation; and (3) the assurance of a reasonably priced supply of gas.  I
will argue that because these factors have proven to be foundational in the
development of the industry’s regulation, the regulatory industry should
continue to take these factors into account when determining a domestic
floor that should be met prior to allowing LNG exports.  As evidenced, the
codification of factors to determine the public interest need not be lengthy
or complicated; it must, however, set forth a bright line standard that guar-
antees companies some measure of certainty.  Once companies are able to
meet this floor or set of factors, they should then move completely into the
free-market arena, devoid of regulatory hindrances.  This structure will
ensure the protection of the domestic public interest, while allowing the
nation to capitalize on the benefits yielded by the international export of
LNG.
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I. The Extraction of Shale Gas and the Production of Liquefied
Natural Gas
The United States’ newfound ability to export LNG results from the
utilization of unconventional resources brought about by hydraulic fractur-
ing.15  A recent study conducted by the Brookings Institute states that
“[t]he case for U.S. LNG exports depends entirely on the continued devel-
opment of unconventional gas.  This development itself depends on the . . .
continuation of the practice of fracking . . . .”16  Recent fracking technology
has allowed exploration and production companies to tap into unconven-
tional resources such as shale gas, coalbed methane, and tight sand gas,
resulting in what some have called a “shale revolution.”17  Oil and gas com-
panies’ newfound ability to drill domestic shales has resulted in an over-
abundance of natural gas and a parallel decrease in domestic natural gas
prices.18  So much natural gas currently exists in the United States that
exporting LNG is really a “no-brainer.”19
Shale gas exists alongside coalbed methane and tight gas as one of the
predominant types of unconventional gas resources and is unique prima-
rily because of the methods used for its extraction.20  To extract shale gas,
exploration companies first drill deep wells and then insert metal casing
and cement into each well to prevent any fracturing fluid or gas from leak-
ing into the water table.21  After this process, they pump fracturing fluid,
composed of salt, sand, water, and various chemical compounds, into the
shale rock at a very high pressure.  This causes the formation of the fis-
sures in the rock, from which gas exits the rock and enters the well.22
Eventually, the gas flows out of the well along with the fracturing fluid and
15. See e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 458
(3d ed. 2010) (asserting that unconventional resources “are not ‘conventional,’ meaning
that gas production from the reservoir does not readily flow into a well bore.”).
16. CHARLES EBINGER ET AL., BROOKINGS ENERGY SECURITY INITIATIVE, EVALUATING THE
PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED EXPORTS OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES 10
(2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/
natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural_gas_ebinger_2.pdf.
17. See KAMAKSHYA TRIVEDI ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, THE SHALE REVOLUTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1– 2 (2012), available at http://schekman.files.wordpress.com/2012/
12/gs-2012-12-05-global-economics-weekly-us-shale-oil.pdf; Shale Gas: Fracking Great,
ECONOMIST (June 2, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21556249.
18. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 457– 58 (pointing out that U.S. natural R
gas production increased due to the introduction of unconventional resources, thus
resulting in low gas prices in the “$3.50 to $4 MCF range that have stayed quite low
through 2009” and that 61% of domestic onshore production in the lower forty-eight
states came from unconventional resources in 2008); SHAWN REYNOLDS, VAN ECK
GLOBAL, THE UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE REVOLUTION: A GEOLOGIST’S PERSPECTIVE,
(2012), available at www.vaneck.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147489701
19. Solid Case for U.S. LNG . . . or Not?, NAT. GAS EUR. (Mar. 4, 2013, 12:25 AM),
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/us-lng-exports.
20. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF Gas: World Energy
Outlook Special Report on Unconventional Gas 18, 21 (2012), available at http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2012/goldenrules/weo2012_goldenrulesre
port.pdf.
21. See id. at 22– 23.
22. See id. at 25– 26.
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enters a gathering line, which collects all the gas from all of the different
wells in the field.23  Once the gathering of the gas is complete, the gas then
flows through the pipes to gas separation/processing facilities, where the
gas is separated from fluids and other particles.24  Finally, the gas enters a
compressor station, where the pressure of the gas is increased, allowing the
gas to flow through transmission pipelines.25
Transmission pipelines exist in an infrastructure similar to motor
highways, as they span the entire United States.26  The Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission (“FERC”) regulates interstate pipes,27 while the states
regulate intrastate pipeline systems.28  At this point, the gas can be sent via
pipeline to local distribution companies or distributors that sell the gas to
local businesses, power plants, and individuals.29  The gas can also be sent
to a liquefaction plant, where the gas undergoes an intensive cooling pro-
cess and becomes a liquid.30  The liquid is then stored in a tank where it
can then be shipped to other locations.31  Once the LNG reaches its desti-
nation, it undergoes a process that converts it into natural gas and it enters
local pipelines.32
II. Domestic Leads in Shale Gas Resources
The United States contains extensive domestic natural gas resources.
It holds enough to both support itself domestically and still export large
quantities abroad.  The United States Energy Information Agency estimates
that approximately 2,203 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of recoverable natural gas
exists within the United States.33  The United States consumes approxi-
mately 24 Tcf per year34 and is estimated to have enough natural gas sup-
23. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 445. R
24. See Golden Rules, supra note 20 at 27; Processing Natural Gas, NATURALGAS.ORG, R
http://www.naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing_ng.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
25. See The Transportation of Natural Gas, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.
org/naturalgas/transport.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
26. See id. at 1; see generally, About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 2 (provid- R
ing a map of the U.S. natural gas pipeline network and general information regarding
the network) (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
27. See The Market Under Regulation, supra note 14, at 3; BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra R
note 15, at 445– 46. R
28. See Intrastate Natural Gas Pipeline Segment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/intrastate.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 446. R
29. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 446. R
30. See Overview, CENTRE FOR ENERGY, http://www.centreforenergy.com/About
Energy/ONG/LiquifiedNaturalGas/Overview.asp?page=1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
31. See id.
32. See Daniel Yergin & Michael Stoppard, The Next Prize, 82 FOREIGN AFF. MAG.
103, 107 (2003).
33. Frequently Asked Questions: How much natural gas does the United States have and
how long will it last?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=58&t=8.
34. Id.
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ply to last the nation for approximately 100 years.35  Domestic natural gas
exists within approximately seventeen shales found in nineteen geographic
basins throughout the continental United States.36
Aside from having vast natural gas resources, the United States main-
tains an extensive natural gas infrastructure and invests in fracturing tech-
nology, which cements it as the international leader in the unconventional
resource industry.  The United States’ monopoly on fracturing technology
provides a significant advantage over the rest of the international commu-
nity.  Few countries have access to the drilling equipment and intellectual
property that has made fracking so successful.37
However, American fracking technology is still rapidly advancing, and
as a result, the amount of natural gas extracted within the United States is
increasing at an extremely rapid rate.38  The rig count in the United States
serves as a concrete indicator of the escalating productivity of fracking
technology.  For instance, from 2008 to 2010, the number of rigs dropped
from approximately 1,600 to 800— a 50% overall decrease.39  Nevertheless,
the quantity of gas produced remained the same.40  Essentially, “advanced
extraction techniques in the US are so productive that if the natural gas rig
count were allowed to rise to the levels that existed 4-5 years ago, we would
be swimming in the stuff.”41
LNG export is thus fast becoming a practical necessity for which the
United States clearly has the infrastructure to support.  The United States
contains an extensive transportation system, liquefaction facilities, a qual-
ity port system, and tankers necessary for the export of LNG.  The Ameri-
can natural gas transportation system boasts 210 natural gas pipeline
systems, 305,000 miles of interstate and intrastate transmission pipelines,
over 1,400 compressor stations, and 400 underground natural gas storage
facilities.42  In addition, the United States currently contains twelve
35. See Editorial: Exporting Natural Gas Would Not Hurt U.S., USATODAY.COM (June
20, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/
2012-06=20/export-liquefied-natural-gas/55722204/1.
36. HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE. UNCONVENTIONAL
CHALLENGES 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/con-
tents/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf.
37. See Cory Renauer, Driving Natural Gas Prices, Part 1: Exports, SEEKING ALPHA
(Oct. 2, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/900261-driving-natural-gas-
prices-part-1-exports; EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23, 26; Muqsit Ashraf & Hermes R
Alvarez, The Shale Game-changer: An Interview with Amy Myers Jaffe of the Baker Institute,
SCHLUMBERGER BUS. CONSULTING, http://www.sbc.slb.com/Our_Ideas/Energy_Perspec-
tives/Summer11_Content/Summer11_Interview_Amy.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
38. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 3– 4 (stating that “from 2000 to 2006, shale R
gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17%; from 2006 to 2010 produc-
tion increased by an annual average rate of 48% . . .” and U.S. shale gas production
“reached 4.87 Tcf in 2010, or 23% of U.S. dry gas production.  By 2035, it is estimated
that [it] will account for 46% of total domestic natural gas production.”)
39. See Renauer, supra note 37, at 2 (presenting a map demonstrating the drop in rig R
count).
40. Id. at 1– 2.
41. Id. at 2.
42. See About Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 2, at 1. R
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import/export terminals scattered throughout the Gulf Coast and the East
Coast.43  Furthermore, six more import/export terminals have been
approved for construction in the United States,44 and fourteen more are
pending approval.45  All of these factors have resulted in an overabundance
of American natural gas resources and a corresponding decrease in domes-
tic natural gas prices, thus improving the United States’ chances for domi-
nation in the international LNG market.46
III. International LNG Export Needs
The United States’ dominant position in the industry is further magni-
fied by the growing international demand for LNG exports, as gas prices
remain high in the rest of the world.47  Because the United States contains
such a large amount of domestic natural gas, prices are extremely low.  To
illustrate, while the price of U.S. natural gas costs roughly $2 per thousand
cubic feet in 2012, the same amount costs $11 in Europe and even as high
as $15 in Asia.48  Clearly, the opportunity for potential arbitrage exists.49
A clear need exists for the export of American LNG to countries
abroad, and as a result, countries in Europe, Asia, and South America are
actively seeking American LNG exports.50  For example, foreign govern-
ments and foreign production companies are pursuing projects with the
U.S. to ensure the export of LNG to their respective countries.  In particu-
lar, Tepco, a Japanese company, is currently negotiating with a “number of
proposed projects in the [United States]” that are attempting to obtain the
necessary authorization from the U.S. government.51  Additionally,
Cheniere, one of the companies that has been granted a permit by the
Department of Energy to export LNG, currently has LNG export contracts
43. North American Existing LNG Import/Export Term, FERC (Mar. 20, 2013), http:/
/ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-existing.pdf.
44. North American Approved LNG Import/Export Terminals, FERC (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-approved.pdf.
45. North American Proposed/Potential LNG Import/Export Terminals, FERC (Mar.
20, 2013), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-proposed-potential.
pdf.
46. Eric Roston, Shale Fracking Makes U.S. Natural Gas Superpower.  Now What?,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-26/
shale-fracking-makes-u-s-natural-gas-superpower-now-what-.html; see Ashraf, supra note
37 at 1, 2
47. See Roston, supra note 46, at 1, 2 (presenting a map showing price differences R
across the globe).
48. LEVI, supra note 5, at 5. R
49. Kenneth B. Medlock III, U.S. LNG Exports: Truth and Consequence, JAMES A.
BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y 7 (2012), http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/
da5493d4/US_LNG_Exports_-_Truth_and_Consequence_Final_Aug12-1.pdf.
50. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 20– 26; see also LEVI, supra note 5, at 18 R
(stating that “Korean imports are expected to rise from 4.1 billion feet a day . . . Chinese
imports are expected to rise from a negligible amount to over nine billion cubic feet each
day by the end of the decade, while Indian imports are expected to reach three billion
cubic feet per day.”); Tepco, supra note 8, at 1; Gonza´lez & Lefebrve, supra note 8, at 2. R
51. See Tepco, supra, note 8, at 1. R
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with customers in England, Korea, India, and Spain.52
Asian countries in particular— who are already some of the largest
importers of LNG— are anticipating significant increases in their LNG
imports.53  For example, “[t]he Pacific Basin has historically been the cor-
nerstone of the global LNG market.  During the early and mid-1990s . . .
Japan and South Korea accounted for approximately 70 percent [of the
LNG export market].”54  As the population in this region increases, the
need for natural gas and LNG exports will skyrocket as well.  For instance,
“[f]rom 2010 to 2020, China’s gas consumption should move from the level
of Japan to the EU and in 2020 China should be the third worldwide con-
sumer after the US and EU.”55  In fact, China and India are expected to see
approximately seven percent increases per year in their gas demand
through 2035.56  Both India and China have invested heavily in construct-
ing additional LNG import facilities to allow increases in imports.57 Addi-
tionally, the March 2011 earthquake in Japan, which resulted in the
Fukushima nuclear power plant meltdown and temporary closure of the
majority of Japan’s nuclear reactors, has precipitated a turn away from its
use of nuclear energy and towards reliance on LNG.58  Experts predicted
that Japan would need approximately 974 billion cubic feet (“Bcf”) of addi-
tional natural gas in 2012 to completely supply its energy needs.59  The
increase in Asia’s demand for natural gas is occurring alongside the
decrease of both local and international resources.60
The European market also has seen an increase in the need for natural
gas and LNG.  For example, “[i]n addition to Russian imports, Europe is
likely to increase its LNG imports.  Despite having excess regasification
capacity . . . new regasification facilities are planned in a number of Euro-
pean countries.”61  Many countries like France and Bulgaria have simply
prohibited hydraulic fracturing due to environmental concerns, thus
increasing the need for American LNG exports.62  Furthermore, the depen-
52. See Gonza´lez & Lefebrve, supra note 8, at 2. R
53. Katarzyna Klimasinska, European Fracking Bans Open Market for U.S. Gas
Exports, BLOOMBERG (May. 23, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-05-23/european-fracking-bans-open-market-for-u-s-gas-exports-1-.html.
54. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 21. R
55. Global LNG Market to Grow 4 pc a Year, Pivot to Asia, BUS. RECORDER (Nov. 12,
2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.brecorder.com/markets/energy/europe/90049-global-lng-
market-to-grow-4pc-a-year-pivot-to-asia-.html (quoting Thierry Bros, energy analyst at
French Bank Societe Generale from his 2012 book After the Shale Gas Revolution).
56. EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. R
57. Id.
58. EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22; One Year Later, ‘Inside Japan’s Nuclear R
Meltdown’, NPR (Feb. 28, 2012, 7:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/28/147559
456/one-year-later-inside-japans-nuclear-meltdown.
59. EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. R
60. Id. at 21– 22.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Klimasinska, supra note 53, at 1; see also Brad Plumer, Will the U.S. export frack- R
ing to the rest of the world?, WASH. POST (July 21, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/21/will-the-u-s-export-fracking-to-the-
rest-of-the-world/ (mentioning the French legislature’s ban of hydraulic fracturing in
2010). .
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dence of Europe on Russia for a large portion of its natural gas places
Europe in a precarious geopolitical position, as evidenced by Russia’s with-
holding of gas from Europe in 2009.63  Europe receives approximately 31%
of its natural gas from Russia64 and understands the difficulty that depen-
dence on Russian natural gas poses, thus prompting efforts to obtain
energy independence.65
Although many other nations contain shale formations with signifi-
cant natural gas deposits,66 because they lack the technology and infra-
structure to harvest these resources, they remain dependent upon other
countries for their gas supplies.67  For example, “[u]nconventional gas pro-
duction will also require technical capacity and physical infrastructure,
both of which are currently in short supply in both China and India . . .
particularly as the pipeline networks in both China and India are inade-
quately developed and as the investment climate for foreign operators
remains uncertain.”68  Additionally, most of these nations will be unable to
develop technology to the level of the United States due to social, eco-
nomic, and physical factors.  For instance, although China has shale forma-
tions with significant gas resources, because they have an “immature oil-
service industry and pipeline structure”69 and do not have access to suffi-
cient water to complete production, they will remain dependent on LNG
imports for the foreseeable future.  Similarly, in Europe, lack of a struc-
tured pipeline system presents a significant hurdle70 for the region’s devel-
opment of unconventional resources.  Furthermore, like China, Europe
holds vast shale gas resources, but “drilling a well in Poland costs about . . .
three times as much as it costs to drill in Texas’ Barnett shale, because
the . . . industry is much less developed.”71
IV. The Benefits and Implications of LNG Exports
The export of LNG can bring a number of economic, social, and politi-
cal benefits both to the United States and abroad.  A number of studies not
63. See generally Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe Shivers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html?
pagewanted=all (describing the 2009 Russian gas cut).
64. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 25. R
65. Derek Brower, Energy Independence for Europe?, PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2010), http:/
/www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/energy-independence-for-europe/; EU Seeking
Energy Independence from Russia, VOICE OF AM. (Nov. 2, 2009, 10:22 AM), http://www.
voa.com/content/a-13-2009-05-08-voa36-68734627/409999.html; Roman Olearchyk,
Ukraine, Wary of Russia, Seeks Energy Independence With $1.5bn Gas Plant, FIN. TIMES
(June 6, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/07/06/ukraine-a-
black-sea-1-5bn-lng-plant/#axzz2P9mUhOvr; Klimasinska, supra note 53, at 4.
66. See Plumer, supra note 62, at 1– 2. R
67. See Klimasinska, supra note 53, at 2; Ashraf, supra note 37, at 2. R
68. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23. R
69. Matthew Brown, Fracking is Flopping Overseas, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May.
3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-03/fracking-is-flopping-over
seas.
70. Klimasinska, supra note 53, at 2. R
71. Plumer, supra note 62, at 2. R
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only confirm the benefits yielded by the export of LNG, but also strongly
advocate that the United States begin to capitalize on the current export
opportunity.72  For example, the Brookings Institution’s Energy Security
Initiative (“ESI”) carried out a study entitled “Liquid Markets: Assessing
the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas” analyzing the various
impacts of exporting LNG.73  The study found that not only are LNG
exports “technically feasible,”74 but they are in fact “likely to be competi-
tive in global markets.”75  Another study carried out by Michael Levi, a
Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment, and the Director of the Pro-
gram on Energy Security and Climate Change for the Council on Foreign
Relations, came to a similar conclusion.76  Levi advocated the approval of
export applications and construction facility applications by the DOE and
FERC,77 stating that the “benefits (of allowing LNG exports) outweigh the
costs of explicitly and directly constraining exports through government
action.”78
First, regarding economic benefits, the export of American LNG will
help produce liquidity in global LNG markets.  The export of LNG to for-
eign countries will help open up foreign commodities market, as these
nations will have access to additional natural gas resources.79  For exam-
ple, “[w]ithout exporting any natural gas, the U.S. shale ‘revolution’ has
already had a positive impact on the liquidity of global LNG markets . . . .
The increased availability of LNG cargoes has helped create a looser LNG
market for other consumers”80  The increase of liquidity in global LNG
markets also produces greater geopolitical security for many nations who
rely on the import of LNG for a significant portion of their energy sup-
ply.81  For instance, many European countries would benefit from an addi-
tional LNG source, as it would allow them to reduce their dependence on
Russian natural gas.82
The export of LNG will also produce significant domestic economic
benefits and might even help to reduce the national deficit.  Levi estimates
that if the United States exports six Bcf per day of LNG, the yearly surplus
will range from $2.7 billion to $3.2 billion.83  He further estimates that the
economic benefits could be even higher if American LNG export contracts
72. See, e.g., EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1; LEVI, supra note 5; MONTGOMERY ET AL., R
supra note 12. R
73. See EBINGER ET AL., supra, note 1. R
74. See id. at vi.
75. Id.
76. LEVI, supra note 5. R
77. See id. at 2.
78. See id. at 6.
79. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 38. R
80. See id. at 38.
81. See id. at 43.
82. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 41– 43. R
83. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 14 (stating that “the gains from selling gas overseas R
rather than at home would be approximately $700 million to $ 1 billion; and the losses
from lower domestic consumption would be approximately $300 million to $500
million.”).
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were based on overseas prices.84  If the United States exported six Bcf at
the European price of $12 per Tcf, the surplus would jump to a range of
$3.9 billion to $4.1 billion.85  At this rate, Levi estimates that total export
revenues would add up to $20 billion, make up roughly five percent of the
current deficit, and help strengthen the dollar.86
When assessing domestic economic benefits, it is also necessary to
discuss the impact that LNG exports would have on domestic natural gas
and electricity prices.  However, the international export of LNG would not
lead to a significant increase in domestic natural gas prices that would
adversely impact the American populace.87  For example, in the Brookings
Institute study, the researchers confirmed that although LNG exports
would result in “negative consequences”88 for the power and industrial sec-
tors, these effects would be, at most, “modest.”89  The researchers even
went as far as to assert that “the benefit of this trade will likely outweigh
the cost to domestic consumers of the increase in the price of natural gas
as most of the natural gas . . . will come from new natural gas production
as opposed to displacing existing production from domestic consumers.”90
Similarly, Levi confirmed in his study that “allowing natural gas exports
could have small but regressive distributional consequences.”91
Serving as further proof that the export of LNG would not signifi-
cantly impact domestic natural gas prices, two additional studies provide
numerical data to support this argument.92  Deloitte conducted a study
that found that from 2016 to 2035, the price of natural gas would increase
by $.12/MMBtu if the U.S. exported 6 Bcf per day internationally, resulting
in a mere 1.7 percent increase to consumers.93  The United States has more
than enough natural gas reserves to export abroad; the issue is simply
ensuring that American exploration and production companies also pro-
duce enough to meet domestic needs first.  Going a step further, the
Deloitte study confirmed that the effect of LNG exports on electricity
prices would be “even smaller than the projected impact on gas prices.”94
For instance, in the Midwest, electricity price increases are anticipated to
84. See id. at 14.
85. See id. (His model also sets forth that “surplus would increase by $1.1 billion for
every one-dollar increase in the overseas natural gas price.”)
86. See id. at 15.
87. See id. at 16.
88. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 33. R
89. See id.
90. See id. at 37.
91. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 16 (calculating an increase in natural gas bills to con- R
sumers of $33).
92. DELOITTE, MADE IN AMERICA: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LNG EXPORTS FROM THE
UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/
Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_MadeinAmerica_LNGPaper_122011.
pdf; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC
ENERGY MARKETS (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/
fe_lng.pdf.
93. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 31; MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 8. R
94. See MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 13. R
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be significantly less than one percent.95  The other macroeconomic bene-
fits yielded by LNG export clearly outweigh the small domestic price
increases that would occur.
Despite all of the positive impacts that LNG exports might yield, a
number of other studies point out some potential economic shortcomings
that LNG exports might bring.96  The U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion (“EIA”) produced a study in January 2012 requested by the Depart-
ment of Energy that specifically studied the effects of LNG exports on the
U.S. domestic energy market.97  Although it reached some of the same con-
clusions as the studies carried out by the Brookings Institute and Levi, it
also presented some areas of economic concern.  For example, the study
confirmed that U.S. natural gas markets would simply increase natural gas
production to meet the new demands of LNG export,98 and that the total
price increases in natural gas and electric bills would be minimal.99  Never-
theless, it also pointed out that “[t]he current large disparity in natural gas
prices across major world regions . . . is likely to narrow as natural gas
markets become more globally integrated.”100  Should the price disparity
decrease between US natural gas prices and those in the European and
Pacific basins, the United States’ arbitrage opportunity will evaporate along
with the incentive to export LNG.
In a study conducted by Kenneth B. Medlock III, an energy economist
at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, Dr.
Medlock examined the role of supply elasticity when determining whether
the export of LNG would result in increased domestic natural gas
prices.101  Similar to the EIA’s study, Dr. Medlock’s study also presents
some positive aspects of LNG.  His baseline assumption is that an elastic
supply of natural gas would not result in increased domestic natural gas
prices and an inelastic supply would result in a domestic price increase.102
He addresses the main concern of many policymakers— a scenario in
which domestic supply would be completely inelastic, international supply
would be very elastic, and domestic natural gas prices would skyrocket.103
He first concludes that this is the “least likely outcome,”104 because of the
overabundant amount of natural gas yielded by the introduction of hydrau-
lic fracking and the exploration of shale plays.105  In fact, the introduction
of these factors has caused elasticity to increase “five-fold,”106 and “in the
U.S. alone there is over 17 Bcf [per day] of export capacity . . . which repre-
95. See id.
96. See EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS, supra note 92; Medlock, supra note 49. R
97. See EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS, supra note 92, at 1. R
98. See id. at 6.
99. See id. at 15– 16.
100. See id. at 4.
101. See Medlock, supra note 49, at 8. R
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id. at 19– 20.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 15.
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sents over 50 percent of current traded volume.”107  Additionally, he then
asserts that “market responses”108 will also not allow domestic prices to
increase beyond reason.
Nevertheless, Medlock also points out some areas of economic con-
cern and concludes that “the long-term volume of exports from the U.S.
will not likely be very large given the expected market developments
abroad.”109  His study points out that natural gas exists in large quantities
across the globe and that countries abroad simply need to harness the
intellectual knowledge that American exploration and production compa-
nies hold in order to develop these unconventional resources.110  Medlock
believes that the price of natural gas will drop in other countries, thus elim-
inating the need for American LNG international exports.111  Based on this
study, American LNG exports will prove lucrative only “in the very near
term.”112
Despite the shortcomings pointed out by the studies above, the DOE
released a study on December 5, 2012 conducted by NERA that not only
addresses some of the weaknesses of the EIA and Medlock studies, but also
definitively states that the export of LNG is in the United States’ best inter-
ests.113  This study serves as the most comprehensive study of the topic to
date.  The study wholeheartedly embraces the export of LNG and points
out that unlimited exports will yield the greatest benefit to the U.S. econ-
omy.  The study states:
The economic impacts of different limits on LNG exports were examined
under each of the market scenarios. Across all these scenarios, the U.S. was
projected to gain net economic benefits from allowing LNG exports.  Moreo-
ver, for every one of the market scenarios examined, net economic benefits
increased as the level of LNG exports increased.  In particular, scenarios
with unlimited exports always had higher net economic benefits than corre-
sponding cases with limited exports.114
It first addresses the previous EIA study and points out that it was “limited
to the relationship between export levels and domestic prices”115 and “did
not evaluate macroeconomic impacts.”116  The study also addresses
Medlock’s claim that foreign countries will develop their own shale
resources, pointing out that both geopolitical and geographical factors
make this unlikely.117  Moreover, the study found that the largest domestic
price increase that could occur would range from approximately $.22 to
107. See Medlock, supra note 49, at 19. R
108. Id. at 34.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 21, 24; see also id. at 23 (arguing that “current arbitrage opportunity . . .
cannot be expected to persist, and the development of new supplies from outside the
U.S. will only . . . further erode regional price differentials . . . .”).
111. Id. at 25.
112. Id. at 30.
113. See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 12, at 1– 2. R
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 17– 18.
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$1.11 (2010$/Mcf).118  It did note that some individuals in the economy
would be negatively impacted by the export of LNG;119 however, ulti-
mately, exporting LNG would yield the most benefits collectively for the
U.S. economy.120  At the end of the day everyone benefits, as “the net result
is an increase in U.S. households’ real income and welfare.”121
Going a step further, the international LNG exports would yield con-
siderable social and political benefits for the United States, both domesti-
cally and abroad.  First, LNG exports would create an enormous number of
domestic jobs for the U.S. economy.  The natural gas industry itself would
create roughly 25,000 jobs up-front,122 with an additional 40,000 created
downstream from the gathering, processing and transportation of the gas,
not to mention jobs produced from the steel and rig manufacturing indus-
tries.123  An even more astounding figure comes from a December, 2011
study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers that estimates that as many
as one million manufacturing jobs might result from the boom in shale
plays.124  However, many of these jobs would be temporary and would not
result in significant permanent employment.125
The international export of LNG would also bring about major foreign
policy benefits, as the United States would gain greater influence in dictat-
ing energy dynamics abroad.  The United States would be able to supply
LNG to its allies abroad, specifically ones that are crippled by a depen-
dence on natural gas from countries with interests contrary to those of the
United States.  For example, LNG exports would help American allies “in
Europe who will gain strategic leverage from the increased competition to
Russian gas.”126  It would also help the United States exert a stronger force
in international trade negotiations.127
V. Department of Energy Regulatory Requirements for the Export of
LNG
The DOE/FE oversees the import and export of natural gas under Sec-
tion 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b, (“NGA”).128  In order to
build an LNG export facility or export LNG, an application must be filed
118. Id. at 2.
119. See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. R
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id.
122. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 6. R
123. See id. at 6, 15.
124. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 16– 17. R
125. See id. at 37; see also LEVI, supra note 5, at 15. R
126. See id. at 47.
127. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that Japan “ha[s] noticed that the . . . U.S.- R
South Korea free-trade agreement will give South Korea special access to U.S. natural gas
exports and have inquired as to whether Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership . . . trade arrangement would give them similar privileges . . . .”)
128. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717b (West 2012); How to Obtain Authorization to Import and/or
Export Natural Gas and LNG, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/
programs/gasregulation/How_to_Obtain_Authorization_to_Import_an.html#LNG%20
Exports (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
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with the DOE/FE in order to obtain authorization.129  A company may
either apply for a long-term or short-term authorization.  Long-term
authorization allows the export of LNG for a period exceeding two
years.130  To gain long-term authorization, in addition to providing a copy
of the gas purchase and sale contract, the applicant must submit “the iden-
tity of the sellers of gas, the markets in which the gas is to be sold, and the
terms of the sale agreement along with a start date.”131  For short-term
authorization, which lasts for no more than two years, actual copies of the
gas purchase and sale contracts are not even required, only submission of
the start-date.132
In addition to obtaining authorization from the DOE/FE to build an
LNG export facility, a company must also file an application with FERC.133
FERC allows a company to obtain a “blanket certificate” in order to cover a
variety of activities that fall under a specific project.134  A blanket certifi-
cate gives the company the opportunity to “undertake a restricted array of
routine activities without the need to obtain a case-specific certificate for
each individual project.”135  It saves the company the time and effort of
applying for a different permit each time it carries out a different project,
and provides the freedom to carry out as many projects as it desires under
the quantitative limit FERC sets.  To obtain a blanket certificate, a company
must first notify all landowners who will be impacted by the project.136
Additionally, the company must also file prior public notice with FERC,
which the regulatory body will publish in the Federal Register.137  If within
sixty days, no person has protested the planned project, then permission to
carry out the project will be granted.138  However, if a protest has been
filed, the company has thirty days to resolve the issue, after which time, if
not resolved, the application will be treated as a project-specific
authorization.139
Finally, the company’s proposed project will undergo significant envi-
ronmental review.  Following the guidelines of the National Environmental
Policy Act, an analysis will be carried out to determine the project’s poten-
tial environmental impact.140  Also, an Environmental Impact Statement
will need to be issued; if the possible impact of the project is predicted to
be minimal, an Environmental Assessment will be carried out to determine
129. See How to Obtain Authorization to Important and/or Export Natural Gas and
LNG, supra note 128, at 1. R
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. R
134. Blanket Certificates, FED. EN. REG. COMM’N (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/gas/indus-act/blank-cert.asp (last updated Mar. 1 2013).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 13. R
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whether or not an Environmental Impact Statement must be issued.141
The project must also comply with the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, the Clean Air Act, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.142
VI. Section 3 of the NGA: Determining What Constitutes the “Public
Interest”
Section 3 of the NGA sets forth very clear standards for the DOE/FE’s
determination of when a company may import or export LNG.  It states
that:
[N]o person shall export any natural gas from the United States to a foreign
country or import any natural gas from a foreign country without first hav-
ing secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so. The Com-
mission shall issue such order upon application, unless, after opportunity
for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importation will not be
consistent with the public interest.143
Furthermore, Section 3(c) of the NGA mandates that the importation of
LNG and the importation and exportation of LNG to a country with which
the United States has a free trade agreement144 must be “deemed consis-
tent with the public interest . . . and granted without modification or
delay.”145  If a company applies for a permit to export LNG to a foreign
country with which the United States has free trade agreements, it is
“essentially automatic.”146  However, applications involving countries with
which the United States does not have free trade agreements do not fall
under the public interest definition of Section 3(c) and will not be automat-
ically granted.147  It is significantly more difficult to obtain a permit to
export to countries with which the United States does not have a free trade
agreement.
This issue is compounded by the fact the United States does not have
free trade agreements with many of the countries that actually need to
import American LNG.148  In fact, “projects looking for authorization to
export LNG to countries without a free trade agreement account for
roughly 96 percent of current global LNG demand.”149  As of the composi-
tion of this Note FERC has granted authorization to only two companies,
Sabine Pass Liquefaction LLC and a partnership comprised of Freeport
LNG Expansion, L.P. and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC, to construct an LNG
141. Id.
142. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717b (West 2012).
143. Id.
144. See Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
145. § 717b.
146. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 10. R
147. See Stephen Miles & Thomas Eastment, US Debate on LNG Exports Centered at
Energy Department, OIL & GAS J. (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/
volume-111/issue-4/special-report-lng-update/us-debate-on-lng-exports-centered.html.
148. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28. R
149. Id.
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Export Facility and to export LNG.150  However, the DOE has stated that it
will review the remaining applications for export to non-FTA countries
within a span of approximately two years, with approximately eight weeks
allocated to the review of each application.151  Thus, due to rising interna-
tional need, the DOE/FE and FERC authorization process needs to be
reexamined.
Currently, no statutes or legislation exist to define what falls within
the “public interest.”152  Additionally, no current legal definition exists in
order to provide guidance as to how permits should be issued.153
Government officials have indicated that the “range”154 of factors they
will analyze include: domestic need, adequacy of domestic natural gas
supply, U.S. energy security, impact on the U.S. economy, job creation,
balance of trade, geopolitical considerations, environmental considera-
tions, and other issues raised by commentators.155  Furthermore, the
DOE/FE has stated that it will take into consideration all public protests
and the company’s responses thereto.156
The first instance in which the DOE/FE issued authority to export
LNG occurred under DOE/FE Order 2833, in which it allowed Sabine Pass
Liquefaction (“Sabine Pass”) to export up to 16 million tons per annum
(“mtpa”), or 2.2 Bcf per day, of LNG to countries that have free trade agree-
ments.157  The DOE/FE followed suit in Order 2961, in which it allowed
Sabine Pass to export the same amount to countries that do not have free
trade agreements.158  Despite receiving several protests and motions to
intervene, the DOE/FE concluded in Order 2961 that the protestors had
not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the authorization of
the export of LNG would be contrary to the public interest.159
In making this decision, the DOE/FE first took into consideration the
applicant’s own public interest analysis.160  First, Sabine Pass argued that
allowing Sabine to export might improve the prospects for domestic LNG
production through an increase in revenue, pointing to the increase of nat-
ural gas production and the corresponding drop in market prices in the
U.S.161  Sabine Pass also asserted that allowing LNG exports to non-free
150. Applications, supra note 4, at 1. R
151. Ayesha Rascoe, Senators Urge U.S. to Speed LNG Review Process, THE MARITIME
EXECUTIVE (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Senators-Urge-
US-to-Speed-LNG-Export-Review-Process-2013-07-11/.
152. See EBINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28. R
153. Id.
154. John Anderson, Natural Gas Import/Export Regulation, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY.
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.usea.org/sites/default/files/event-file/511/Anderson_DOE_
LNG_Exports.pdf.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 2833 (Sep. 7, 2010), 6, avail-
able at http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/Orders_
Issued_2010/ord28332.pdf.
158. DOE/FE Order 2961, supra note 11, at 42. R
159. Id.
160. Id. at 5.
161. Id. at 6, 14– 15.
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trade countries would serve the public interest by (1) creating jobs; (2)
decreasing American dependence on foreign oil; (3) bolstering the National
Export Initiative (“NEI”) through furtherance of the United States balance
of payments yielded by increasing U.S. exports; (4) ensuring domestic nat-
ural gas price stability; (5) helping liberalize and foster liquidity in the
global gas market; (6) improving national security interests and assisting
foreign trade partners by providing alternate sources of global natural gas
supplies; and (7) improving ties with foreign nations.162  Another major
factor that Sabine Pass focused on was the domestic natural gas market
within the United States.  It provided several studies demonstrating that
the export of LNG to foreign countries would not encroach on domestic
natural gas needs and would also allow for the generation of additional
natural gas production.163  Sabine Pass even asserted that:
[B]oth reports have concluded that the potential for future recovery of
domestic gas production is ‘more robust’ than presented in EIA forecasts and
both reports find that domestic natural gas resources are sufficient to meet
all future demand scenarios under consideration, and, therefore, the export-
ing of up to 2 Bcf/d proposed in the application will not be inconsistent with
the public interest.164
Additionally, it noted that demand for natural gas within the United States
was decreasing.165
Next, the DOE/FE outlined three general factors that it considers
when determining whether a project conflicts with the public interest.  Fol-
lowing Policy Guidelines set forth in 1984, which seek to minimize federal
regulations and allow market determination of prices, the DOE/FE sought
to maintain a hands-off position.166  It stated that the Guidelines estab-
lished that:
[The market], not government should determine the price and other con-
tract terms of imported [or exported] natural gas.  The federal government’s
primary responsibility in authorizing import [or exports] will be to evaluate
the need for the gas and whether the arrangement will provide the gas on a
competitively priced basis for the duration of the contract while minimizing
the regulatory impediments to a freely operating market.167
Next, seeking to maintain the tenets of a past Delegation Order, the DOE/
FE emphasized its desire to focus on the domestic need for natural gas.168
In sum, the DOE/FE stated that it would analyze the project’s impact on
the public interest with regards to (1) domestic need for natural gas pro-
duction; (2) the connection between exports and domestic natural gas sup-
ply security; (3) any other issue deemed to be appropriate; and (4)
162. Id. at 6– 7.
163. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at 14.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Id. at 28.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 29.
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environmental factors.169
When analyzing Sabine Pass’s specific case, the DOE/FE found that
Sabine had provided enough studies and statistical data demonstrating its
ability to meet both the domestic demand for natural gas and also the
amount necessary for international export over the 20-year term of the
requested authorization.170  Furthermore, it accepted Sabine Pass’s asser-
tions regarding the ways the exportation of LNG would benefit the domes-
tic market and create jobs.171  Since the opponents of Sabine Pass could
not provide enough data to refute Sabine Pass’s information, the DOE/FE
refused to grant their petitions.172  The DOE/FE stated that:
[A]lthough the opponents of the requested authorization have alleged poten-
tial negative impacts from a grant of the requested authorization, their argu-
ments are not supported by factual studies or analyses and the opponents
have not demonstrated that any potential negative impacts associated with a
grant of the requested authorization are likely to outweigh the overall bene-
fits from such authorization . . . .173
Nevertheless, the DOE/FE admitted that the data provided by Cheniere
could not “prove completely accurate over the entire 20-year projected term
of the requested authorization.”174  Different variables could produce dif-
ferent results and outcomes.175  Nevertheless, the DOE/FE asserted its role
in continuing to oversee the exports of LNG and the need to make sure that
these exports would not result in a decrease of LNG sufficient to harm the
public interest.176  The DOE/FE stated that it could “take action as is nec-
essary or appropriate should circumstances warrant it.”177  It reserved the
right to decide whether to authorize future LNG exports.178
The DOE/FE also analyzed some of the broader international effects of
allowing exports and the domestic implications.  It asserted that the orga-
nizations opposing Cheniere’s LNG export application had failed to show
that the proposed exports would result in domestic natural gas prices
becoming linked to international gas prices.179  The DOE/FE then con-
firmed that the LNG exports would not harm U.S. energy security as the
U.S. maintains an adequate supply of domestic natural gas.180  It also clari-
fied that allowing exports would not result in further U.S. oil imports.181
The DOE/FE recognized further beneficial impacts exports would have in
(1) creating new markets globally for gas; (2) helping other countries turn
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 30.
172. Id. at 31.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Id. at 31.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 32– 33.
177. Id. at 33.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 34.
180. Id. at 34– 35.
181. Id. at 35.
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away from oil and coal; (3) helping foreign countries to obtain alternate
sources of natural gas (thus resulting in increased market liquidity/trans-
parency); and (4) cutting the link between oil and natural gas in foreign
markets.182
Most recently, pursuant to Order 3282, the DOE/FE issued a permit to
Freeport LNG Expansion L.P. and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC (“FLEX”) con-
ditionally granting long-term multi-contract authorization to export LNG
by vessel from the Freeport LNG terminal on Quintana Island, Texas to
non-free trade agreement nations.  Although the DOE/FE granted the per-
mit to export, as it did in Order 2961, the lack of clarity in deciphering
exactly which factors the DOE/FE values and the order in which they value
those factors proves somewhat disturbing.  Basically, if a company is able
to provide better statistics than the opposition in proving its case, the
DOE/FE will grant the permit.
Similar to Order 2961, the DOE/FE first took into account the appli-
cant’s own public interest analysis.  The applicant addressed the following
seven factors: (1) the impact of the proposed exports on natural gas prices;
(2) domestic natural gas supplies and resource base; (3) domestic natural
gas demand; (4) benefits to the local, regional, and national economy; (5)
balance of trade; (6) global environmental benefits; and (7) national secur-
ity benefits.183  Regarding the impact of the liquefaction project on natural
gas prices, FLEX asserted that “the proposed exports will have minimal
impact on U.S. natural gas prices.”184  It supported its assertion with sta-
tistical data provided in a report it independently commissioned along
with data provided by the EIA.185  Similarly, FLEX argued that the LNG
exports would not “materially impact the availability of natural gas supply
within the United States,”186 pointing to technological advances in drilling
and further statistics supporting its data.187  Regarding domestic natural
gas demands, FLEX believes that “natural gas produced and exported from
the Liquefaction Project will not be needed to meet domestic demand for
decades, if ever.”188  FLEX additionally pointed to the economic benefits
that would be produced as a result of the exports at the local, regional, and
national levels through job creation, the generation of tax revenues, and
increased economic activity more generally.189  FLEX last asserted that the
Liquefaction Project would improve the U.S. balance of trade, assist in
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and support American energy
security.190
182. Id. at 37.
183. Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 3282 (May 17, 2013), 12
[hereinafter DOE/FE Order 3282], available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/
05/f0/ord3282.pdf.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 13– 14.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id. at 15– 17.
188. Id. at 18.
189. Id. at 19.
190. Id. at 19– 21.
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The DOE/FE next addressed the EIA and NERA studies previously dis-
cussed in Section V, detailing the scope and mechanics of both studies.
Regarding the results of the EIA study, the DOE/FE pointed out that the
“EIA generally found that LNG exports will lead to higher domestic natural
gas prices, increased domestic natural gas production, reduced domestic
natural gas consumption, and increased natural gas imports from Canada
via pipeline.”191  Additionally, the DOE/FE mentioned the EIA’s finding
that the largest natural gas price increases would arise in situations of low
supply, whereas a situation of high supply would result in “the smallest
price response.”192  The DOE/FE also pointed to the EIA’s finding that
increased natural gas exports would result in consumers paying slightly
higher natural gas and electricity bills, with the highest increases occurring
in the industrial sector.193  On the other hand, the DOE/FE also explained
the NERA study, which included a macroeconomic energy-economy model,
which the EIA study had failed to include.194  The DOE/FE pointed out
that it drew “on several of the scenarios that EIA had developed . . . adding
global market scenarios developed through its GNGM model.”195  The
DOE/FE indicated that the NERA pointed to “net economic benefits across
all scenarios” and that “the benefits that come from export expansion out-
weigh the losses from reduced capital and wage income to U.S.
consumers.”196
Furthermore, the DOE/FE pointed out that although the study indi-
cated that LNG exports would result in higher U.S. natural gas prices, “the
market limits how high U.S. natural gas prices can rise under pressure of
LNG exports.”197  Perhaps most encouraging was the DOE/FE’s espousal
of the NERA’s finding that “[m]acroeconomic impacts of LNG exports are
positive in all cases” and that “the United States would experience net eco-
nomic benefits from increased LNG exports in all cases studied.”198  Nev-
ertheless, the DOE/FE did note NERA’s finding that “impacts will not be
positive for all groups in the economy”199 and that wage earners would not
benefit from the LNG exports.200  The DOE/FE included a particularly
important NERA finding, noting that energy-intensive industries would not
be seriously impacted.201  Finally, however, the DOE/FE pointed out that
the report found that “even with unlimited exports, there would be net eco-
nomic benefits to the United States.”202
191. Id. at 34– 35.
192. Id. at 36.
193. Id. at 37– 38.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 41.
198. Id. at 50.
199. Id. at 52.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 55.
202. Id.
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The DOE/FE then conducted its analysis by explaining each of the
challenges presented by opponents of LNG exports, presenting the DOE/
FE’s stance on the challenges presented, and pointing to relevant studies
(either the EIA or NERA studies or other studies) to bolster its point.  For
instance, commenters first “challenge[d] the data used as inputs to the
LNG Export Study”203 and argued that “the NERA study underestimated
future demand for natural gas and . . . underestimated the likely increases
to natural gas prices from LNG exports.”204  The DOE/FE responded, how-
ever, that “[i]n an undertaking of this scope and magnitude” it was “per-
fectly reasonable” to use the paradigm the EIA/NERA employed to carry
out their research.205  The DOE/FE then went on to address commenters’
allegations that the NERA “study overstated the likely macroeconomic ben-
efits from LNG exports” and conflated GDP growth with welfare
growth.206  The DOE/FE, however, did not hesitate to point out that the
NERA used separate statistical measures and did not conflate the two
ideas.207
Additionally, commenters argued that the NERA model failed to ade-
quately address industry-specific impacts,208 specifically the difficulties
manufacturing industries will face with increased natural gas prices, and
underestimated the value of manufactured finished goods for export rather
than LNG exports.209  In response to the commenters’ assertions, the
DOE/FE concluded that “[t]here is no one-for-one trade-off between gas
used in manufacturing and gas diverted for export” and that the study ade-
quately captured the industry-specific impacts.210  The DOE/FE pointed
out that for manufacturing industries, “the overall impact . . . will be rela-
tively muted, with no individual industry experiencing a dramatic negative
impact.”211  Regarding commenters’ argument that households would be
minimally benefitted,212 the DOE/FE said that the export studies indicated
that despite this information, the net benefit to the whole economy made
LNG exports a worthwhile endeavor.213  The DOE/FE also addressed the
concern of commenters that increased LNG export would result in “boom-
and-bust” cycles damaging regional areas214 and responded that the DOE/
FE’s case-by-case review would hedge against this damage.215  Com-
menters also argued that the studies may have overestimated domestic nat-
ural gas supply, which the DOE/FE ensured it would continue to
203. Id. at 57.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 61.
206. Id. at 66.
207. Id. at 66– 67.
208. Id. at 68.
209. Id. at 68-69.
210. Id. at 71.
211. Id. at 72.
212. See id. at 73– 75.
213. Id. at 75.
214. Id. at 76.
215. Id. at 77.
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monitor,216 but the DOE/FE still did not think that “NERA employed
overly optimistic projections of domestic gas supply.”217
The DOE/FE analyzed further challenges posed by commenters, as it
addressed their assertion that NERA did not employ the business model
actually used by those exporting LNG exports218 and also failed to account
for foreign direct investment (which would result in royalties and income
from LNG exports benefitting foreign parties).219  Yet again, the DOE/FE
emphasized the precision of the NERA study, stating that it “reflects an
accurate understanding of the contractual terms and market environment
affecting the fossil industry and . . . provides a plausible future scenario of
international trade in LNG with U.S. exports.”220  The DOE/FE also
addressed commenters’ concerns regarding natural gas price volatility,
pointing out that if domestic wholesale prices rose “above the LNG netback
price, LNG export demand is likely to diminish, if not disappear alto-
gether.”221  Additionally, the DOE/FE pointed out NERA’s assertion that a
price differential would always exist between international LNG prices and
U.S. domestic prices, thus affirming the profitability of LNG exports.222
Most importantly, commenters challenged the procedural methods
implemented by the DOE/FE for determining the public interest standard.
They argued that the DOE/FE needed to implement formal criteria for
determining what constitutes the public interest.223  Additionally, they
stated that that the DOE/FE should “articulate, in the context of a separate
rulemaking proceeding, the framework it will use in making its public
interest determinations for individual export applications.”224  Moreover,
some commenters argued that “citations to third-party studies in the
record do not discharge DOE/FE’s responsibility to evaluate the public
interest because the studies are based on undisclosed proprietary data and
models with limited information regarding their development and age.”225
The answer that the DOE/FE provided for these concerns proved dissatisfy-
ing.  The DOE/FE concluded that it had given the public sufficient oppor-
tunity to challenge the pending LNG proceedings.226  It did not address the
commenters’ concerns on instituting a separate rulemaking proceeding or
looking at information other than third-party studies.  The DOE/FE merely
stated that it retains “broad discretion to decide what procedures to use in
fulfilling its statutory responsibilities under the NGA, and our view is that
the record is sufficient to support the actions we are taking.”227
216. Id. at 78– 80.
217. Id. at 82.
218. Id. at 86.
219. Id. at 86– 87.
220. Id. at 89.
221. Id. at 99.
222. Id. at 191.
223. Id. at 106.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 107.
226. Id. at 108.
227. Id. at 109.
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After this long analysis, the DOE/FE finally addressed the sufficiency
of the data provided by FLEX.  It first asserted that based on the lack of
support provided by the opponent of the Flex application, APGA, it could
grant the permit application.228  It stated that APGA’s argument “was not
supported by any significant analysis and . . . that material did not identify
meaningful errors or omissions in the studies submitted by FLEX.”229
Next, it stated that, based on the results of the EIA and NERA studies, the
Freeport LNG permit would not conflict with the public interest.230  Never-
theless, aside from these factors, the DOE/FE then stated “[w]e have not
limited our review to the contents of the LNG Export Study but have con-
sidered a wide range of other information.”231
The first factor that the DOE/FE turned to was the international
ramifications of granting the LNG permit.232  It also looked to the “eco-
nomic impacts of higher natural gas prices and potential increases in gas
price volatility.”233  Perhaps most disturbing, however, were some of the
DOE/FE’s concluding remarks, as it reminded the company and individu-
als reading the order that it maintained sole discretion over granting per-
mits.234  First, the DOE/FE stated that it would look to previous decisions
and orders when reviewing future export permits.235  It then stated that it
“will attach appropriate and necessary terms and conditions to authoriza-
tions,”236 and that “[o]ther conditions will be applied as necessary.”237
When providing its reasoning for doing so, the DOE/FE stated that the
EIA/NERA studies were not completely precise in their predictive accuracy,
that the effects of LNG exports are uncertain, and that the market is ever-
changing.238  The DOE/FE’s rationale for attaching terms and conditions
as it sees fit is “for protection of the public interest.”239
VII. The History of American Natural Gas Regulation: Taking the
Best from the Past
The regulatory framework for the international export of LNG should
mirror the domestic regulatory framework already in place for natural gas
and the transportation of interstate natural gas because (1) the U.S. already
maintains an efficient regulatory system with a clear framework for deter-
mining the public’s best interests; (2) the regulatory system utilizes a mar-
ket-based approach to regulating the industry and eschews price
regulation; and (3) the regulatory system protects consumers from produc-
228. Id. at 110.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 111.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 112– 14.
235. Id. at 113.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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ers’ monopolistic actions while maintaining a free market system.  To better
understand exactly why the DOE/FE should follow the existing frame-
work, it is necessary to look at the system’s historical development in order
to see which factors the federal government came to view as most vital to
the maintenance of the public interest.  The current success seen across the
natural gas industry and the many benefits enjoyed by consumers can be
attributed in large part to the “carefully constructed deregulatory pro-
gram”240 carried out by FERC in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  For
instance:
Today, competitive forces are being relied upon more heavily to determine
market structure and operation.  However, this has not always been the case.
Almost all aspects of the natural gas industry were regulated at one point –  a
situation which led to tremendous difficulties in the industry, including the
natural gas shortages experienced in the 1970s.241
In short, it is necessary to understand the path that federal regulators took
to reach this point because their journey “provides insights that can be
useful in identifying potential ways of attaining socially beneficial results
in many analogous contexts.”242
The production of natural gas first developed in an environment of
regulation at the local level— municipalities regulated producers in order to
prevent the formation of monopolies.243  However, as the industry grew,
the regulatory framework similarly had to change in order to meet the chal-
lenges producers presented.244  For instance, as gas came to be transported
through interstate pipelines, the government realized that no federal body
existed to regulate this interstate transport, and, as a result, began to take a
closer look at how it might monitor this arena.245  It saw that the “inter-
state transportation of gas was a natural monopoly function that required
regulation by someone.”246  For this reason, Congress commissioned the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to determine whether the interstate
pipeline system constituted a natural monopoly that required regula-
tion,247 and the FTC found that a monopoly existed.248  As a result, Con-
gress passed the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which gave the Federal Power
Commission (“FPC”) authority to regulate interstate natural gas transpor-
tation and rates.249  Again, the reasoning behind this bill was to prevent
“monopolistic tendencies of interstate pipelines [from] charg[ing] higher
240. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 53, 53 (1995).
241. The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/regula-
tion/history.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
242. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 53. R
243. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
244. See id..
245. See id.
246. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 53. R
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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than competitive prices due to their market power.”250
Although severe regulation had already been imposed on the interstate
transport of natural gas, the decision that really shook the industry was
made in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,251 where the Supreme Court
instituted price controls on natural gas producers at the wellhead.252
Immediately, this task caused the FPC problems as it sought to establish a
coherent system of price controls.253  Frankly, this system was doomed to
failure, because “no agency [could] impose price controls on a structurally
competitive market without creating a shortage of the regulated product or
service.”254  The FPC set a series of price ceilings that rose to a price that
was still “significantly less” than the price of natural gas sold in the open
market.255
Unfortunately, the damage had been done.  Sadly, “ignorance with
respect to basic principles of microeconomics induced many legislators to
believe that price controls benefited consumers.”256  But because the gov-
ernment had set the price of natural gas so artificially low, people con-
sumed natural gas at an unsustainable rate.257  Also, in response to the low
prices, producers stopped exploring for and producing natural gas— it was
simply not profitable for them to do so.258  The combination of these two
factors resulted in a shortage of natural gas across the nation with produc-
ing states having sufficient natural gas reserves but consuming states fac-
ing dire shortages.259
In response to this crisis, the government saw the need for change and
began its slow crawl towards deregulation.  In 1978, Congress passed the
Natural Gas Policy Act with the aim of “[c]reating a single national natural
gas market,” “[e]qualizing supply with demand,” and “[a]llowing market
forces to establish the wellhead price of natural gas.”260  This act resulted
in the transformation of the FPC into FERC while simultaneously setting
price ceilings at a much higher rate, with some of the price ceilings gradu-
ally being eliminated.261  Nevertheless, despite all of the government’s
efforts, more problems began to arise.262  As the prices of natural gas
250. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
251. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
252. See id. at 677 (finding “that Phillips is a ‘natural gas company’ within the mean-
ing of that term as defined in the Natural Gas Act, and that its sales . . . are subject to the
jurisdiction of and regulation by the [FPC].”)  The wellhead is a pressure-controlling
mechanism through which oil and natural gas exit the reservoir and enter the pipeline
or other production equipment. See Well Completion, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.
naturalgas.org/natural gas/well_completion.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
253. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
254. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 54. R
255. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
256. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 54. R
257. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
258. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 240, at 54. R
259. See id.
260. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
261. See id.
262. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 240, at 55. R
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increased, market demand began to drop.263  This drop negatively
impacted producers and other industry providers; it specifically hurt pipe-
lines because many had committed themselves to “take-or-pay” con-
tracts.264  There was too much natural gas being produced, coupled with
low consumer demand, and even though the pipelines did not need gas
from suppliers, they were still contractually obligated to pay for the receipt
of gas.265
Although some deregulation had occurred under the Natural Gas Pol-
icy Act, during the 1980s, significant strides were taken towards complete
deregulation.  Under the Natural Gas Policy Act, price regulations on well-
head prices were gradually being eliminated.266  FERC then turned and
focused its deregulation efforts on the pipelines.  Previously, pipelines had
sold natural gas and its transport to consumers together.267  However,
FERC instituted a process of “unbundling” whereby consumers would pay
separately for natural gas and its transport.268  Consumers would now
have the option to choose a different producer and pipeline from which to
purchase their gas.  FERC had turned the pipelines into “open-access com-
mon carriers”269 and made them “transporters rather than merchants.”270
FERC Order No. 436 formalized this separation of the purchase of gas
from its transportation as it “established a voluntary framework under
which interstate pipelines could act solely as transporters of natural
gas . . . .”271  Because consumers would now voluntarily purchase their
natural gas directly from producers rather than as part of a package deal
from the pipeline, the system came to be called “open access.”272
Even more substantial deregulation of natural gas producers and natu-
ral gas prices occurred in 1989 when Congress eliminated all federal price
regulations on wellhead sales with the passage of the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act.273  This act was followed shortly by FERC Order No. 636,
also known as the “Final Restructuring Rule,”274 in which FERC mandated
that all pipelines unbundle gas sales, transport, and storage;275 again, this
ensured that consumers would have access to multiple options and could
make their own decisions on what to purchase.  This order was “seen as
the culmination of all of the unbundling and deregulation that had taken
place in the past [twenty] years.”276  Previously, unbundling had been vol-
untary under Order No. 436, but Order No. 636 now made it a mandatory
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 240, at 55. R
269. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 507. R
270. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 240, at 84. R
274. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
275. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 84. R
276. The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
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requirement.277
VIII. The Structural Framework for International LNG Export
Regulation: Ensuring the Optimal Balance of Government
Regulation and Involvement
While a certain degree of deregulation is needed within the natural
gas sales and transportation system industry, complete deregulation is not
a viable goal.  There are certain aspects of the industry that must continue
to be regulated because energy is the industry upon which all other indus-
tries depend.  Without access to a steady supply of natural gas, inhabitants
in different areas of the United States will, quite literally, freeze to death.278
For this reason, it is necessary that the United States ensure, regarding
LNG exports, that domestic consumers have access to a steady supply of
natural gas— enough to meet their basic needs.  However, once LNG
exporters demonstrate that they, or other market producers, are able to
meet a baseline supply for domestic consumers for a set number of years
extending into the future, the exporters must have unfettered access to
international markets.  The benefits that the United States will reap from
allowing LNG export companies to export abroad far outweigh any poten-
tial negative implications.  As the studies above have demonstrated, some
hazards will likely arise as a result of exporting LNG.  Nevertheless, the net
advantages and profits that LNG exports might potentially yield make
efforts to refine and illuminate the structural and substantive regulatory
framework all the more urgent.  A clear structural regulatory approach is
necessary in order to facilitate the international export of LNG.
Thus, in order to implement a structural framework that promises a
maximal amount of deregulation coupled with regulation in only the most
important areas, one need only look to the current domestic regulatory
system for natural gas production within the United States and the manner
in which it has evolved.  An analysis of the structural framework of the
domestic natural gas regulatory system shows that although the govern-
ment has tried to implement as much deregulation as possible, certain
areas of the system— those that impact the lives of domestic consumers,
including pipelines and local distribution companies— are still regu-
lated.279  Throughout the history of the domestic natural gas regulatory
system, an emphasis has always been placed on preventing the formation of
monopolies.280  The federal government has worked diligently to prevent
natural gas suppliers from using their positions to extract unfair rents from
277. See id.; see also Pierce, supra note 240, at 84. R
278. See Marc Brown, New England Ratepayers Need Greater Access to Natural Gas,
CTPOST.COM (Mar. 15, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.ctpost.com/opinion/article/New-
England-ratepayers-need-greater-access-to-4358568.php.
279. See The Market Under Regulation, supra note 14.
280. See generally The History of Regulation, supra note 241 (providing an overview of R
the history of regulation and the reasons for the imposition of various regulatory mea-
sures and acts).
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domestic consumers.281  In fact, local municipalities who feared that natu-
ral gas producers were in a position to “charge overly-high prices” and
abuse their market power were the driving force behind the development of
a regulatory system.282  Furthermore, the FPC— the predecessor of FERC—
was created to monitor the interstate pipeline system which had been deter-
mined was in fact a natural monopoly.283  At every step of the development
of the industry, the government has worked to ensure that consumers have
access to a reliable and steady source of natural gas.  Additionally, as a
further measure to prevent natural gas producers and transporters from
exploiting domestic consumers, the government went so far as to institute
price controls.284  Price controls on wellhead sales in the United States
lasted for a period of nearly forty years.285
Although government officials sought to protect consumers, they real-
ized that such intrusive means of regulation and market-control was ulti-
mately deleterious.286  Beginning with the passage of the Natural Gas
Policy Act in 1978, the government slowly began to implement deregula-
tion.287  Over the course of several decades, it steadily raised price ceilings,
with the ultimate goal of allowing prices to be determined by the mar-
ket.288  Nevertheless, the government still had to undo all “disastrous pol-
icy decisions that were made between 1938 and 1978.”289  Because many
of government’s previous policies had disproportionately benefitted pipe-
lines as they capitalized on the price regulations through the use of take-or-
pay contracts, many pipelines sought to “stall the process of implementing
the new market-based regulatory strategy” that exposed them to the risk of
large losses.290  Still, the government continued down its path of deregula-
tion, completing abolition of all wellhead price ceilings in 1989 and insti-
tuting the pipelines’ unbundling process in 1992.291
The large amount of deregulation implemented throughout the late
80s and early 90s has produced many beneficial results; deregulation
incentivized many industry members and producers to invest in more effi-
cient and productive means of drilling and producing, and natural gas
transportation systems have become more cohesive.292  Furthermore,
roughly five billion dollars’ worth of improvements occurred in various
areas throughout the industry as a result of deregulation.293  When the
deregulated natural gas market during the harsh winter of 1993-1994 is
281. See generally Pierce, supra note 240 (documenting the efforts of the government R
to protect consumers).
282. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
283. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 53. R
284. Id. at 54.
285. Id. at 84.
286. Id. at 54.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 55, 84.
289. Id. at 55.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 84.
292. Id.
293. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 529. R
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compared to the regulated market during a similarly cold winter in 1976-
1977, it is clear that the deregulated market in 1993-1994 performed sig-
nificantly better.294  Ultimately, “FERC’s extraordinary success in subject-
ing the gas industry to the unmatched discipline of a competitive market
should be a source of many lessons that can be valuable in efforts to
restructure other industries whose performance has been disap-
pointing.”295  The government achieved such a high level of deregulation
that “the natural gas business [of today] would hardly be recognized by
people who knew it in the 1970s.”296
Nevertheless, pipelines and local distribution companies remain regu-
lated.  The rationale for keeping these areas regulated is that “competition
between pipelines . . . would not necessarily be in the public interest.”297
For example, interstate pipeline companies face regulation in the construc-
tion of their pipelines, the content of the gas in their pipelines, and the
price imposed on clients.298  Similarly, state utility commissions monitor
the activities of local distribution companies.299  As a result of the indus-
try’s development, pipelines are considered common carriers— they do not
sell natural gas and serve merely as transporters.300
FERC ensures that pipeline companies do not capitalize on their
monopoly positions, and it emphasizes preventing harm to consumers.301
Some of FERC’s specific goals include: “[p]reventing discriminatory or
preferential service;” “[a]cting as a surrogate for competition where compe-
tition does not or cannot exist;” and “[p]rotecting customers and market
participants through oversight of changing energy markets, including miti-
gating market power and ensuring fair and just market outcomes for all
participants.”302  At the end of the day, however, FERC “consider[s] all dif-
ferent points of view, and issue[s] a decision based on what it believes is
the best course of action for the industry in general.”303
There are a number of problems with the current regulatory frame-
work for the international export of LNG to companies who do not have a
free trade agreement with the United States.  First, the current regulatory
framework lacks clarity.  No precise formula exists as to how or why the
DOE/FE will grant a permit to a non-FTA country.  Basically, as long as a
company can prove to the DOE/FE that its project is better than not, the
DOE/FE will grant the permit.  However, the DOE/FE’s process lacks a
bright line rule or standard.  No list of elements or the order of their impor-
tance exists for companies to help them determine objectively whether they
294. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 84. R
295. Id. at 84-85.
296. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 507. R
297. See id. at 509 (quoting Justice Scalia in Maryland People’s Counsel v. FERC, 761
F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
298. See The Market Under Regulation, supra note 14. R
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See The Market Under Regulation, supra note 14. R
302. Id.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
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will qualify for a permit to export LNG.  The granting of a permit essen-
tially comes down to a battle of the statistics— whichever side can produce
the best numbers wins or defeats the issuance of the permit.  Furthermore,
the process is transitory.  Although the DOE/FE is presently allowing LNG
permit exports, the language in Section 3 and Order 3282 indicates that
the DOE/FE, in its sole discretion, may change its position.  Similar to the
regulatory framework currently in place for LNG exports, when the DOE/
FE decides whether to allow pipeline expansion, it takes into account three
factors: (1) the project’s impact on the public interest, (2) the project’s eco-
nomic viability, and (3) environmental implications.304  Before a company
embarks on constructing or extending a pipeline, it must first obtain a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity.305  To obtain a certificate, a
pipeline company must demonstrate that the construction of the pipeline
is in the public interest.306  However, in practice, the DOE/FE can issue or
reject a pipeline application for any reason whatsoever at its sole discre-
tion.307  For example, the Natural Gas Act states: “The Commission shall
have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exer-
cise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions
as the public convenience and necessity may require.”308
The structural regulatory framework for pipelines has essentially been
transferred to international LNG exports.  For example, the factors the
DOE/FE considers are: (1) domestic need for natural gas production, (2)
domestic security concerns, (3) any other issue deemed to be appropriate,
and (4) environmental factors.309  However, regardless of the material an
LNG exporter presents that their project may serve the public interest (or
how convincing that material may be), ultimately, the DOE/FE may grant
or reject an application to export to countries with which we do not have
free trade agreements for any reason whatsoever.310  In its most recent
order, the DOE/FE stated that it has “broad discretion to decide what pro-
cedures to use in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities under the
NGA . . . .”311  Going a step further, the DOE/FE was so bold as to say that
it “will attach appropriate and necessary terms and conditions to authori-
zations”312 and that “[o]ther conditions will be applied as necessary.”313
This framework does not mirror the mix of the deregulated system of natu-
ral gas producers coupled with the regulated pipeline system.  It simply
superimposes the highly regulated pipeline system on the international
LNG export regulatory framework.  The DOE/FE has unfettered power over
whether an LNG exporter is granted a permit to export to countries with
304. See id.
305. See Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f (West 2013).
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Id. § 717f(e).
309. DOE/FE Order 2961, supra note 11, at 29 (emphasis added). R
310. See id.
311. DOE/FE Order 3282, supra note 183, at 109. R
312. Id. at 113.
313. Id
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\46-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 33 13-JAN-14 9:40
2013 Let’s Not Reinvent the Wheel 643
which we do not have free trade agreements.  There is no clear guidance as
to what exactly an LNG producer must produce or present in order to
obtain approval.314  This lack of guidance only magnifies the regulatory
power of the DOE/FE and impinges on the competitive market.  Currently,
the DOE/FE seems to support the international export of LNG, and, based
on the two orders issued, the DOE/FE appears likely to grant future LNG
export permit applications.  At any point, however, the DOE/FE could uni-
laterally decide that LNG export is not in the public interest and com-
pletely reverse its stance.  Allowing the DOE/FE this “broad discretion”315
through its determination of “any other issue determined to be appropri-
ate”316 endows the DOE/FE with an inordinate amount of power.  For this
reason, some objective set of criteria or standards should exist for compa-
nies to reference in order to guarantee themselves some measure of secur-
ity.  Their ability to export LNG should not be governed by the whims of
the DOE/FE, which may change at any given point.
Second, rather than superimpose the highly regulated structure of the
pipeline system onto the international LNG export system, regulators
should take a more fluid and less restrictive regulatory approach.  The his-
tory of the natural gas regulatory system shows that a regulatory system
comprised of marked regulation coupled with a market-based approach is
highly beneficial.317  The positive aspects of regulation should obviously
be utilized, but deregulation should still remain the focus.  Once the basic,
underlying values of the current system can be met, the domestic natural
gas regulatory framework should guide the regulatory framework for inter-
national LNG export.  For example, the one maxim that has undergirded
the natural gas regulatory system has been the prevention of monopo-
lies.318  This anti-monopoly function is the reason that the federal regula-
tory system was created in the first place.319  Once natural gas exporters
comply with basic regulations protecting domestic needs, they should then
be allowed to operate in the structural framework of the natural gas pro-
duction system, where no regulation or price ceilings exist. This arrange-
ment ensures perpetuation of the system’s values, protection of the
consumer, and stimulation of the economy.
Third, in order to minimize the structural regulatory framework for
international LNG export, the DOE/FE must set clear standards for what is
required to meet the public interest.  It is only by demarcating exactly what
information the DOE/FE requires that international LNG exporters will
truly be free of regulatory constraints and able to participate in the interna-
tional LNG market.  In particular, the DOE/FE should: (1) collapse the
“domestic security concerns” prong into the “domestic need for natural gas
production” prong and focus solely on domestic need, (2) eliminate the
314. DOE/FE Order 2961, supra note 11, at 29. R
315. DOE/FE Order 3282, supra note 183, at 109. R
316. DOE/FE Order 2961, supra note 11, at 29. R
317. See Pierce, supra note 240, at 54. R
318. See id. at 53; see also The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
319. See The History of Regulation, supra note 241. R
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“any other issue deemed to be appropriate” prong, and (3) minimize the
importance of the “environmental factors” prong.320
When issuing Order 2961 to Cheniere, the DOE/FE took into account
multiple factors— for example, it recognized the potential of LNG exports in
creating new global markets, helping other countries move away from coal,
and increasing market liquidity, among numerous other domestic bene-
fits.321  It is not enough to say that a combination of these vague, unquan-
tifiable factors satisfies the public interest requirement.  Going a step
further, in Order 3283, the DOE/FE ultimately based its decision on the
results of the EIA/NERA studies.322 Although it stated that the opposition’s
comments were “not supported by any significant analysis and . . . that
material did not identify meaningful errors or omissions in the studies sub-
mitted by FLEX,”323 the DOE/FE did not seem to focus on any hard data
provided by FLEX.  The DOE/FE appeared to take the stance that because
the opposition had not made any truly challenging arguments, and because
the EIA/NERA studies support LNG export, more generally, FLEX would
be granted an export permit.  And although the factors currently weigh in
FLEX’s favor, this may not be the case for additional companies further
down the road.  By focusing on these external factors, the DOE/FE essen-
tially takes the power out of the LNG producers’ and exporters’ hands— the
process detracts from LNG producers’ and exporters’ ability to determine
whether they qualify for a permit.
Additionally, the DOE/FE spent the majority of its analysis defending
the studies against challenges brought by commenters.324  The DOE/FE’s
decision whether to grant a company an LNG export permit should not be
based so disproportionately on a third party’s research, but instead should
be focused on data that the company itself provides, guaranteeing its abil-
ity to serve a set amount of LNG to the domestic market for a set number of
years.  The DOE/FE must set a numerical baseline for how much LNG
exporters should be expected to provide domestically over the next twenty-
five or fifty years.  Once exporters meet that numerical floor, they should
be free to export to any country in any quantity.  Furthermore, if the
domestic need for natural gas production has been met, whether any secur-
ity concerns exist surrounding domestic supply is moot.  Additionally, the
“any other issue deemed to be appropriate” prong should be removed
because it places the international LNG regulatory framework within the
domestic pipeline regulatory framework.  As it currently exists, this prong
inhibits deregulation because it places too much power in the hands of the
DOE/FE and does not allow the amount of deregulation found in the
domestic natural gas regulatory system.
Finally, when evaluating environmental factors, unless the LNG
export will cause immediate or potential catastrophic damage, the LNG
320. See DOE/FE Order 2961, supra note 11, at 29. R
321. See id. at 35, 37.
322. See generally DOE/FE Order 3282, supra note 183. R
323. Id. at 110.
324. See generally DOE/FE Order 3282, supra note 183. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\46-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 35 13-JAN-14 9:40
2013 Let’s Not Reinvent the Wheel 645
export permit should be issued immediately.  This is not to say that envi-
ronmental factors should be completely disregarded.  LNG export compa-
nies should still be expected to provide environmental assessment reports
demonstrating that they will not significantly harm the environment.325
The point is simply that the importance of the third prong should be
minimized.
IX. The Substantive Framework for International LNG Export
Regulation: Three Factors the DOE/FE Should Consider
When Determining the Public Interest
When determining whether a permit to export LNG is in the public
interest, the DOE/FE should look to three factors: (1) the prevention of
monopoly and abuse by producers, (2) the protection of consumers from
exploitation, and (3) the assurance of a reasonably priced supply of gas.
This trio will ensure that LNG exporters will be able to meet domestic
demands before exporting LNG internationally.  These factors underlie
many of the FPC and FERC rulings on administrative issues related to nat-
ural gas production, transportation, and marketing.  For example, as stated
in NAACP v. FPC, “in order to give content and meaning to the words ‘pub-
lic interest’ . . . it is necessary to look to the purposes for which the Acts
were adopted.”326  Some of the older case law that helped form the devel-
opment of the domestic regulatory system serves as an example of the fac-
tors that should be taken into consideration by the DOE/FE when
conducting its analysis.  Once the DOE/FE determines a number that
meets all three of these criteria, that number should serve as the baseline
for LNG exporters.  After LNG exporters prove that they are able to meet
that baseline of supplying domestic need, then they can enter the domestic
natural gas structural framework, where they will be able to export as
much LNG as they desire at whatever prices the market sets.
A. Prevention of Monopoly and Prevention of Abuse by Producers
The first developmental issue faced by the federal government in regu-
lating the natural gas industry was the prevention of monopoly and abuse
by producers.  Several cases contain language that demonstrates the preva-
lence of this issue in shaping the industry.  For example, in Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, the Supreme Court ruled on a case in which a
company applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.327
The company wanted the certificate to be valid only for the duration of a
gas sales contract that it had signed.  Nevertheless, the Court held that the
FPC had the ability to issue the certificate indefinitely and disregard the
company’s request for a time limitation.328  When the Court looked at
whether it should grant the company’s request, it considered a number of
325. See id. at 259.
326. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976).
327. See Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
328. See id. at 156– 58.
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factors that point to the underlying goal of preventing the monopolistic
tendency of producers.329  For example, the Court said that “though the
primary practical problem that led to the passage of the Act was the great
economic power of the pipeline companies as compared with that of com-
munities seeking natural gas service[,]”330 “[t]his Court declared as early
as the Hope Natural Gas case that the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act
was ‘to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas
companies.’”331  The Court then went on to state that this was the “back-
drop” against which it would make its decision.332
The language from Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC333 demonstrates
yet again the emphasis placed on preventing monopolies and abuse of con-
sumers.  This case points out that the federal regulatory system existed to
prevent large producers from unfairly capitalizing on their position in the
market.334  In this case, the court reviewed orders made by the FPC in
which the FPC had prevented rate increases by the Mississippi River Fuel
Corporation.335  The Mississippi River Fuel Corporation sought to increase
prices to its consumers, but the court refused to allow the rate increase.336
The court reasoned that “[t]he regulation of the transporter and the large
scale seller . . . was apparently the chief purpose of Congress in enacting
the law.”337  The court pointed out that the policy value underlying this
regulation was ultimately for the good of the consumer and not the
utility.338
The federal government, concerned with preventing producer abuse,
ensured that no area was left unsupervised.  The government’s approach
proved to be comprehensive, as it ensured that the FPC’s oversight be con-
ducted in the most careful manner possible.339  For instance, in Tennessee
Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, the court held that a pipeline built by a natu-
ral gas transmission company did not meet the specifications of the certifi-
cate issued by the FPC, and thus, was an “unauthorized facility.”340  The
court specified that “whenever natural gas is dedicated to interstate com-
merce it is the manifest duty of the Commission to scrutinize the transac-
tion in all its facets to the end determination of the public convenience and
necessity.”341  Similarly, in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, when
reasoning that the FPC’s jurisdiction extended to helium-bearing natural
329. See id. at 141– 43.
330. Id. at 143.
331. Id. at 147 (quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944)).
332. Id.
333. 121 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1941).
334. See id. at 164.
335. See id. at 161.
336. See id. at 165.
337. Id. at 164.
338. See id.
339. See, e.g., Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 340 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1964).
340. Id. at 101– 02.
341. Id. at 102 (citing Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378,
391– 92 (1959)).
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gas,342 the court not only stated that “to hold otherwise would be to
render the operation of the [NGA] less effective,”343 but also that “it would
be an incongruous result if the statute was construed to obtain the opposite
result.”344  Furthermore, the court also stated that although the NGA “was
not intended to regulate the entire natural gas field to the limit of constitu-
tional power, it is equally clear that Congress did not desire that an impor-
tant aspect of this field be left unregulated.”345  Again, in the famed Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin Case, part of the reasoning the Court provided
for implementing price controls was that the congressional purpose for the
FPC was “to plug the ‘gap’ in regulation of natural-gas companies resulting
from judicial decisions prohibiting . . . state regulation of many of the inter-
state commerce aspects of the natural-gas business.”346  This regulation
extended even to the local level.  Although the federal government could
not itself regulate every aspect of the natural gas industry, it delegated to
the appropriate bodies the oversight of activities such as the production
and gathering of natural gas347 that fell under the powers of the states.348
Nevertheless, the existence of local jurisdiction over FPC jurisdiction was
to be “clearly shown” and “strictly construed.”349
B. Protection of Consumers from Exploitation
Aside from working to stymie monopolies and prevent producer
abuse, federal government officials also sought to protect consumers from
exploitation.  In fact, the protection of consumers served as the underlying
reason that the federal government proved so fastidious in its efforts to foil
monopolies.350  A number of cases, beginning in 1941 with Mississippi
River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, set forth that the NGA existed primarily for the
protection of the consumer.351  As a result, protecting consumers from
exploitation by natural gas producers became the lifeblood of the FPC.352
The court’s language surrounding the protection of consumers initially
proved to be narrow, and frankly, quite lenient.  For example, in the 1954
case of Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,353 although the court undoubt-
edly emphasized consumer protection, it similarly alluded to the rights of
the natural gas companies.  As the court reviewed a petition of a natural
342. See Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
343. Id. at 680.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 683 (citation omitted). See FPC v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S.
498 (1949); see also Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S.
507 (1947).
346. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682– 83 (1954).
347. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 691 (1947).
348. See id. at 690.
349. Id. at 690, 691.
350. See FPC v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972) (citing FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944)).
351. See Miss. River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 121 F.2d 159, 164 (8th Cir. 1941).
352. See Cal. Gas Producers Ass’n v. FPC, 421 F.2d 422, 428– 29 (1970) (citing Atl.
Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959)).
353. 209 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1953).
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gas producer appealing the reduction of its rates by the FPC,354 it reasoned
that “[t]he primary purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to protect the users
of gas against exorbitant exactions at the hands of natural gas companies
and on the other hand assure to them the right of a fair return from their
operations.”355  The court went so far as to point out that it is the “statu-
tory duty of the Commission to establish . . . rates [for natural gas] that are
fair and just to the utility . . . .”356
However, as time passed, courts did not mention the aforementioned
rights of natural gas companies, and they focused instead solely on protect-
ing the consumer.  In FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the Supreme
Court held that the FPC had the authority to regulate instances in which
pipeline companies would restrict interstate natural gas sales; the only area
the FPC could not regulate was sales directly to consumers.357  The Court
reasoned that “[t]he Natural Gas Act of 1938 granted FPC broad powers ‘to
protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas compa-
nies.’”358  Here the Court mandated that the FPC was only to take action
in instances of exploitation.  The Court then spoke to the creation by Con-
gress of a “ ‘comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme’ of dual state
and federal authority”359 so that there are “no ‘gaps’ for private interests to
subvert the public welfare.”360  So important was consumer protection that
the federal government ensured that every area of the industry had some
sort of governmental oversight.
Towards the end of the 1970s, courts seemed to take an even more
protective stance of consumers as they interpreted the NGA to protect con-
sumers not just in instances of exploitation but also in their normal usage
of natural gas.  For instance, in Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., the petitioner tried
to obtain damages from a natural gas producer for not meeting the terms of
the FPC’s certificate of convenience and necessity.361  In reaching its con-
clusion, the court reasoned that “the overall purpose of the Natural Gas Act
is to protect the interest of consumers in an adequate supply of gas and at
reasonable rates.”362  This reasoning broadened the standards for which the
NGA would protect ordinary consumers.  Consumers were not only pro-
tected from abuse; they also were guaranteed dependable rates.  The Fifth
Circuit used the same language in its reasoning in Florida Power & Light
Co. v. FERC, a case in which the court affirmed a FERC order preventing a
company from meeting obligations to provide natural gas for use as boiler
354. See id. at 720– 21.
355. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
356. Id. at 727.
357. See FPC v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 638 (1972).
358. Id. at 631 (quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944)); see
also FPC v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19 (1961); Sunray Mid-Continent
Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 147 (1960).
359. Id. at 631 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind.,
332 U.S. 507, 520 (1947)).
360. Id. at 631.
361. See Clark v. Gulf Oil Corp., 570 F.2d 1138, 1140– 41 (3d Cir. 1977).
362. Id. at 1145– 46 (emphasis added).
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fuel because using boiler fuel for natural gas during times of shortage was
contrary to the public interest.363  The court stated that this particular pur-
pose of the NGA in ensuring an “adequate supply of gas and at reasonable
rates”364 was already “well established.”365  It also stated that “courts have
consistently recognized that the Act gives the Commission broad authority
to limit or proscribe contractual arrangements . . . .”366
Regardless of the breadth of the approach taken by the court, the
desire to protect the consumer was clearly the underlying value of the NGA
and regulatory system.  The desire of the court to protect the consumer
could be seen through: (1) its meticulous attention to addressing consum-
ers’ concerns, (2) its consideration of consumer’s interests not just in the
present but also in the future, and (3) its commitment to meeting consumer
needs even in times of hardship. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases dem-
onstrates the validity of the first two points.  Here, the Supreme Court held
that the FPC maintained the power to institute area price regulations.367
Nevertheless, the Court held that the FPC, in its price analysis, had to “at
each step . . . assess the requirements of the broad public interests . . . .”368
Furthermore, “the ‘end result’ of the Commission’s orders must be mea-
sured as much by the success with which they protect those interests as by
the effectiveness with which they ‘maintain credit . . . .’ ”369 Aside from the
Court’s emphasis on meticulously assessing consumer interests at each
step, the Court also pointed to the exigency of protecting future consumer
interests.  It stated that “[t]he Commission’s responsibilities include the
protection of future, as well as present, consumer interests.”370  Finally, in
another case, the court demonstrated its dedication to protecting the con-
sumer through its desire to provide supplies, even in emergency circum-
stances.  In Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., v. FPC, the court
sided with the FPC in deciding that the FPC “has residual emergency pow-
ers to impose an interim plan [for natural gas supply or its curtailment]
where there is no adequate alternative.”371  This decision came in response
to litigation brought by customers attempting to prevent pipelines from cut-
ting their gas supply.372
363. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 598 F.2d 370, 380– 81 (5th Cir. 1979).
364. Id. at 379. See California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 523 (1978); see
also Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 147, 151– 54 (1960); Clark,
570 F.2d at 1145.
365. Id.
366. Id. See, e.g., In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 783– 84 (1968);
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
367. In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 768, 770, 771, 772, 774.
368. Id. at 791.
369. Id. (citation omitted).
370. Id. at 798.
371. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
372. See id. at 378, 381.
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C. Assurance of a Reasonably Priced Supply of Gas
Aside from protecting consumers from exploitation by natural gas pro-
ducers and transporters, the government sought to ensure that consumers
would have access to a reasonably priced supply of gas.  The government
sought not just to prevent consumer abuse, but also to guarantee consum-
ers a comfortable standard of living through reliance on affordable,
dependable natural gas sources.  This particular interpretation of this pur-
pose of the NGA arose in 1959 in the case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public
Service Commission of New York.373  In this case, the Supreme Court
refused to back the issuance of unconditional permanent certificates at
firm prices to natural gas producers.374  Part of the Court’s reasoning was
that the “purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to underwrite just and rea-
sonable rates to the consumers of natural gas.”375  Furthermore, the Court
stated that the Act “was so framed as to afford consumers a complete, per-
manent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and
charges”376 and pointed out that congressional intent was to “give full pro-
tective coverage to the consumer as to price . . . .”377  The Court then made
a similar move in Atlantic Refining Co. v. FPC when it held that the Com-
mission was correct to issue a certificate of public convenience authorizing
the reduction of the base price of natural gas sales.378  The Court reasoned
that “natural gas shall be sold in interstate commerce for resale for ultimate
public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use
at the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of
adequate service in the public interest.”379
However, as seen above, during the 1970s, the federal government
took an increasingly protective stance of consumers.380  Rather than
ensure only that rates would be reasonable, the government also wanted to
make certain that consumers would have an adequate long-term supply of
natural gas at low rates.  For the sake of consumers, the government
wanted to ensure that prices remained reasonable for the foreseeable
future.  For instance, in Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases v. FPC, the
court sustained an FPC order that established price ceilings for wellhead
natural gas sales.381  Part of its reasoning was that “[t]he purposes of the
Act encompass not only reasonably low rates but maintenance of adequate
service for the consumer . . . .”382  The court even ordered the FPC to elabo-
rate on future industry impacts that its orders would produce.383  It stated
that “[p]redictions along this line are subject to obvious infirmities, but at
373. Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
374. See id. at 382, 392.
375. Id. at 388.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 389.
378. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677, 680– 81 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
379. Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
380. See supra Section X.B.
381. S. La. Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 1970).
382. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
383. See id. at 443.
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least the possibilities can be identified and probabilities assigned to
them.”384  This reasoning was similarly echoed by the court in Public Ser-
vice Commission. of Kentucky v. FERC, where the court wanted to ensure
that the policy goal of the entire nation having access to an adequate sup-
ply of natural gas was met.385  In this case, local users in Kentucky could
demand natural gas from local producers under state law; nevertheless, the
court held that FERC could request a certificate of public convenience and
necessity prior to the state granting these local requests, in order to ensure
that the needs of people in one area were being met not at the expense of
the needs of others.386
So focused was the government on ensuring that individuals across
the nation receive reasonable rates of natural gas for an extended period of
time that in 1975, the Fifth Circuit gave the FPC permission to institute a
national rate for wellhead sales.387  This level of authority to ensure the
reasonable rates for an extended period nationwide only increased in 1987
in Office of Consumers’ Counsel, State of Ohio v. FERC, when the court
allowed FERC to step into the shoes of natural gas producers.388  For exam-
ple, FERC could force the utility to use more expensive ways of providing
energy to consumers if doing so would prevent consumers from bearing
unnecessary expenses.389
Conclusion
Due to the shale revolution that has taken place in the United States, a
large amount of natural gas currently exists within the nation’s pipeline
system.390  The United States contains such a large amount of domestic
natural gas that the domestic price has dropped significantly and is much
lower than prices in countries across the globe.391  This overabundance of
domestic natural gas, coupled with increasing international need for LNG
exports abroad, has triggered a debate in the United States as to whether
LNG exporters should be allowed to export to countries with which the
United States does not have free trade agreements.392  Although various
studies indicate that LNG exports would yield both beneficial and negative
results, the fact remains that the economic benefits of exporting LNG far
384. Id.
385. See Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of Ky. v. FERC, 610 F.2d 439, 442, 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1979).
386. Id. at 444.
387. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1077, 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
388. See Office of Consumers’ Counsel, State of Ohio v. FERC, 808 F.2d 125, 131– 33
(D.C.Cir. 1987).
389. See id.
390. See John Ydstie, U.S. Has a Natural Gas Problem: Too Much of It, NPR (Apr. 17,
2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/17/150766635/u-s-has-a-natural-gas-
problem-too-much-of-it.
391. See LEVI, supra note 5, at 5. R
392. See Arjun Sreekmumar, Debate Over U.S. LNG Exports Heats Up, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/04/03/debate-over-
us-lng-exports-heats-up.aspx.
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outweigh its costs.393
In order to prepare for the export of LNG, a clear, organized regulatory
system must be in place to maximize the benefits that export will poten-
tially yield.  In particular, three factors that have proven important in the
industry’s development have been: (1) the prevention of monopoly and
abuse by producers, (2) the protection of consumers from exploitation, and
(3) the assurance of a reasonably priced supply of gas.  These are the fac-
tors that should be used to decide whether an LNG export permit would
harm the public interest.  The DOE/FE must set a floor specifying a set
amount of domestic gas that must be provided by LNG exporters prior to
exporting LNG internationally.  Once it is determined that this floor meets
the above three criteria, LNG exporters should then be allowed to operate
in the structural regulatory framework of the domestic natural gas produc-
tion market where little regulation exists.
The DOE/FE should not provide ambiguous standards as to how it
will judge whether an LNG export application is in the public interest.
Rather, the regulatory system for LNG export should mirror the domestic
regulatory system for natural gas production.  The regulatory structure and
factors used to determine whether a permit is in the public interest should
be clear and definite in order to facilitate the process.  Furthermore, as
much deregulation as possible should be allowed; nevertheless, regulation
should not be totally eschewed but should be focused on the areas that are
most important to the industry.  It is only in this way that we can maximize
the benefits from LNG exports and harness those benefits to strengthen
our domestic economy.
393. See MONTGOMERY ET AL., supra note 12, at 6. R
